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Abstract 
The preparation of accurate valuation reports is among the most 
challenging elements of the resolution mechanism. That 
challenge is underlined by the following observation: during the 
crises in the past decade, for almost half of the bailed-out banks 
the estimates for losses and capital needs were initially too low, 
resulting in several rounds of public capital injections. The single 
resolution mechanism has introduced a formal procedure with 
three valuations, respectively, to determine whether a bank is 
failing or likely to fail (valuation 1), to inform about the use of the 
resolution tools including bail-in (valuation 2), and to ensure 
that the ‘no creditor worse off’ condition is respected (valuation 
3). This paper gives an initial assessment of the preparation of 
valuation reports in resolution. It finds that there are still 
substantial uncertainties regarding the outcome of these 
valuations due to organisational, legal and economic 
challenges. In order to reduce the uncertainties, several 
measures are suggested, such as improving the IT systems, 
increasing the use of historical data, shortening the procedure 
to assign the valuator, introducing a moratorium, and 
harmonising the insolvency laws for banks in a way that 
integrates the insolvency and resolution regimes.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Accurate valuation reports are essential for the overall success of a bank resolution. If valuation reports 
are inaccurate they can drag out the financial distress or prompt shareholders and creditors to file suit 
and ask for compensation. This holds even more so now than in the past, when systemically important 
banks in need were supported by their national governments. Those valuations performed on an ad 
hoc basis were often inaccurate: For almost half of the banks that received public recapitalisation the 
initial estimated losses and capital requirements were too low, resulting in multiple rounds of public 
capital injections.  
 
The introduction of the Single Resolution Mechanism with the bail-in of creditors has increased the 
importance of valuations, leaving less margin for error. If the valuation is too high, it might require 
additional capital injections including bail-ins later on. If the valuation is too low, it might require the 
Single Resolution Fund to compensate creditors in order to respect the ‘no creditor worse off’ principle 
and cause higher losses (hard bail-ins), which potentially might lead to more significant negative 
spillover effects on the economy, especially during systemic crises.  
 
At the same time the valuation has been formalised in the single resolution mechanism, which includes 
three types of valuations, respectively, to determine whether a bank is failing or likely to fail (valuation 
1), to inform the use of the resolution tools including bail-in (valuation 2), and to ensure that the no 
creditor worse off principle is respected (valuation 3). This analysis focuses on the second and third 
valuations, which are performed by independent valuators. 
 
There are still major challenges to providing more robust results. For example, the provisional valuation 
report for Banco Popular (valuation 2) – the only bank resolution at the time of writing – explicitly 
indicated that the valuation results were “highly uncertain”. Based on the initial valuation reports and 
experiences with the valuations of failed banks in the aftermath of the 2007–09 global financial crisis 
and the 2010–12 eurozone economic crisis, this paper identifies seven main challenges in the 
preparation of the valuations.  
 
The main challenges include the time and information available to prepare the valuation, but there are 
also legal and economic challenges. The legal challenges, on the one hand, make it more difficult to 
come up with robust valuations (non-harmonised national insolvency regimes and misselling), while 
on the other hand they affect the credibility of the valuation (disclosure). The economic challenges 
primarily involve predicting the impact of deteriorating conditions just before the resolution and 
credible estimations of the economic developments afterwards. 
 
Although there will always be some degree of uncertainty in valuations, there are definitely measures 
imaginable that could improve the accuracy of the valuations, in particular, 
• improving the IT systems of the banks;  
• increasing the use of historical data on previous bank failures;  
• shortening the procedures to select the valuator;  
• introducing a moratorium to allow a short suspension of payments if necessary; and  
• harmonising the insolvency regime for eurozone banks in a way that integrates both resolution 
and insolvency.  
The proposed measures address most of the challenges except for misselling, which could be 
addressed with consumer protection regulation and supervision to limit malpractice.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Valuing a bank in resolution is one of the most challenging elements in a resolution procedure. On the 
one hand, the valuations need to be accurate to avoid negative spillovers for the real economy and 
consecutive bail-ins. On the other hand, the valuations will have to be performed at short notice, which 
increases the likelihood of inaccuracies (PWC, 2016). 
 
In resolution, the valuation of bank assets and liabilities is likely to diverge substantially from the 
accounting values. The international accounting standards used by most banks require in principle 
reporting the fair value of assets, which should be equal to the market value. However, for a large share 
of the banking assets there is no liquid market available to determine the fair value. It is especially that 
part of assets in the bank balances that is valued based on amortised costs and models that might 
cause losses in case of resolution, which often takes place during economic and financial crises and is 
accompanied by time pressure suppressing the asset prices. Moreover, the losses in resolution also 
depend on the resolution tool applied, whether the activities are wound up, sold immediately, or 
continued aiming to maintain the franchise value. 
 
The challenge that valuation poses to bank resolution was also shown in the 2007–09 financial crisis 
and the 2010–12 eurozone economic crisis, in which many banks received several rounds of public 
recapitalisation. In total 72 eurozone banking groups received public capital support in the period 
between 2007 and 2014, of which 33 banking groups (46%) were recapitalised more than once (De 
Groen and Gros, 2015). This means that the initial capital injection was insufficient to cover the future 
losses and capital requirements, which could be due not only to mistakes in the valuation, but also to 
deteriorating economic and financial conditions or to initial recapitalisations that were too 
conservative.  
 
Simple mistakes can lead to large differences in valuation. For example, during the financial crisis Fortis 
Bank was bailed out and separated into Dutch and Belgium/Luxembourg parts, which were 
recapitalised separately by the respective national governments. Yet the recapitalisation of the Dutch 
part did not properly anticipate the consequences of the consolidation of the Dutch activities of Fortis 
Bank Nederland and ABN Amro into a single bank, as was decided at the time when the Dutch 
government acquired the activities. The bank required €6.9 bn of additional capital to address the 
capital shortfall and the costs of the restructuring necessary for the consolidation (European 
Commission, 2010).1 
 
The post-crises reforms have made bank crisis management more orderly than during the crises. In 
particular, the introduction of the resolution mechanism with resolution authorities and resolution 
funds, as well as procedures such as the resolution plan and tools to resolve failing banks, should ensure 
that the authorities are better prepared and have more time if a bank fails. This should have made it 
easier for authorities to determine the value of the failing bank. However, the shift from public bail-
outs during the crises to private bail-ins to cover the losses in resolution has increased the importance 
of the valuation exercise. Indeed, during the crises the burden sharing was only applicable to equity 
and in some cases subordinated debt holders. Capital injections by national governments covered the 
remainder of the losses as well as the recapitalisation. When the amount of capital required was initially 
underestimated, as in the case of Fortis Bank Nederland, the government injected additional capital 
into the bank. Under the old situation of public bail-outs, the initial undercapitalisation in most 
instances had limited impact and the loss would have been covered by the government anyway; with 
the implicit government guarantee, there was limited effect on the funding costs and they could 
sustain lending to the real economy. 
                                                             
1 The main reason for the additional capital was the different treatment of intangible assets for prudential 
requirements before and after the consolidation. 
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Under the resolution mechanism the valuation will largely determine who will be subject to a hard or 
a soft bail-in. The valuation determines not only the total loss, but also which creditors should absorb 
the loss (hard bail-in) or conversion to capital (soft bail-in) according to the creditor hierarchy (Gros and 
De Groen, 2016). The Single Resolution Fund could potentially contribute up to 5% of total liabilities 
and own funds to the resolution, but in practice the losses of systemically relevant banks in most cases 
are likely to be lower than the 8% minimum bail-in that is required before the fund can be used (De 
Groen and Gros, 2015). Moreover, if the fund has to contribute to the resolution this is likely be in the 
form of capital for the resolved bank, reducing the soft bail-in but not the hard bail-in, which would 
require absorbing losses.  
 
Both under- and overestimations of the value of the resolved bank can be problematic. If the total 
losses in the valuation are underestimated (Type I error), this might impact the lending of the bank to 
the real economy and exacerbate the total losses due to deteriorating funding conditions as well as 
recurring resolutions. If the losses are overestimated (Type II error), some creditors might face higher 
losses than necessary, which may cause negative spillover effects on other banks and the wider 
economy as well as a higher chance that compensation needs to be paid for violation of the no creditor 
worse off principle. Especially in times of systemic crises the spillover effects might become 
problematic. Overall, an underestimation (Type I error) seems to be most problematic, with recurring 
losses aggravating the total losses. 
 
There is always a certain degree of uncertainty about the value of bank assets, particularly in times of 
crisis. This paper focuses on how the degree of uncertainty can be reduced as much as possible. It 
discusses the specific challenges for the valuations in resolution performed by independent valuators. 
Moreover, it assesses the different possibilities to improve the valuation process as well as mitigate the 
potential consequences of inaccurate valuations. The remainder of this paper discusses the different 
valuations in resolution in section 2. This is followed by a discussion of the challenges related to the 
valuations provided by independent valuators in section 3. In section 4, several potential measures to 
improve the valuation process and mitigate the consequences of inaccurate valuations are assessed. 
In section 5, conclusions are drawn, followed by policy recommendations.  
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 VALUATION IN RESOLUTION 
There are three valuations in resolution (see Figure 1). Valuation 1 is to determine whether a bank is 
failing or likely to fail. Valuation 2 is to inform the selection of resolution tools, including the bail-in of 
creditors. Valuation 3 determines whether creditors have been worse off than under the normal 
insolvency regime. 
 
Figure 1: Valuations in resolution 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on EBA (2017). 
 Valuation 1: Failing or likely to fail 
Valuation 1 determines whether a bank is deemed failing or likely to fail. Together with ascertaining 
whether there are reasonable private alternatives and or public interests involved, these aspects form 
the main criteria for putting the bank in resolution. When a bank is failing or likely to fail, and there are 
no reasonable private alternatives or public interests at stake, it is supposed to be liquidated under the 
applicable national insolvency regime. This valuation is based on the standard financial reporting 
obligations and regulatory capital requirements on a going concern basis, which are required for 
continuing authorisation. The supervisory authority or resolution authority has to determine whether 
a bank is failing or likely to fail (KPMG, 2017). 
 
 Valuation 2: Resolution measures 
The aim of valuation 2 is to determine the resolution tools and the extent that liabilities and equity 
need to be written down (hard bail-in) and converted into capital (soft bail-in). Indeed, especially the 
sale of business, bridge institution and asset separation tools are expected to affect the loss as well as 
the capital required (see section 3.3.2).  
 
The value of the assets and liabilities is based on the present value of the expected future cash flows, 
i.e. economic value. This valuation is like valuation 1 on a going concern basis. This value might differ 
from the first valuation based on the reporting standards and capital requirements, because of the 
resolution tools and different perspective on future losses. Based on the adjustment in present value 
and creditor hierarchy, the losses, capital requirement and bail-in can be determined. 
 
This valuation is conducted by an independent valuator in the run-up to the resolution and finalised as 
closely as possible to the resolution action. When, due to urgency, it is not possible to fulfil all the 
requirements on time, the initial valuation can take the form of a provisional valuation. This valuation 
Valuation 1
Failing or likely to fail
•Determines whether 
resolution should be 
triggered
•Pre-resolution
•Going concern
•Value based on 
accounting and 
prudential rules 
•Performed by 
supervisor (or 
resolution authority)
•Article 32 of the Bank 
Recovery and 
Resolution Directive 
(BRRD)
Valuation 2
Resolution measures
•Determines resolution 
tools (including bail-in)
•Finalised in resolution 
weekend
•Going concern
•Economic value in 
absence of resolution
•Performed by third-
party valuator
•Article 36 BRRD
Valuation 3 
No creditor worse off
•Determines whether 
creditors have been 
worse off 
•Gone concern
•Economic value in 
liquidation
•Post-resolution 
weekend
•Performed by third-
party valuator
•Article 74 BRRD
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can be prepared by the resolution authority itself. This valuation includes a buffer to account for 
uncertainty in the estimations and ensure that the bail-in will cover the losses. The provisional valuation 
2 needs to be finalised as soon as practically possible and can be integrated into valuation 3. 
 
 Valuation 3: No creditor worse off 
Valuation 3 is to determine potential compensation for creditors that were disadvantaged by a bail-in. 
This valuation will estimate the difference between the compensation that creditors received in 
resolution (valuation 2) and liquidation. The necessary counterfactual to determine the value in 
liquidation will be based on the discounted cash flows that reasonably could have been expected 
under the national insolvency regimes without taking into account potential government support.  
 
This valuation, unlike valuations 1 and 2, is based on a gone concern. The losses in liquidation (as a 
gone concern) are likely to be higher than under valuation 2 (a going concern), because of the loss 
giving default (litigation costs, collection procedures, loss of franchise value, etc.) that can be assumed 
in the event of liquidation. Valuation 3 is conducted based on the information available before the 
resolution action by the same independent valuator that is responsible for valuation 2 and is completed 
as soon as reasonably possible after the resolution action. 
 
The remainder of this analysis focuses on the valuations performed by independent valuators 
(valuations 2 and 3).  
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 CHALLENGES IN PREPARING VALUATION REPORTS 
There are various challenges in the preparation of the valuation reports. The most pressing are of an 
organisational nature, but there are also some legal and economic challenges. The challenges 
discussed in this section have primarily been identified based on the resolution of the Spanish Banco 
Popular in June 2017 and other banks that have failed (or been bailed out or liquidated) in the past 
couple of years. At the time of writing, Banco Popular is the only bank for which the Single Resolution 
Board (SRB) has disclosed part of the (provisional) valuation report (valuation 2). 
 
In the valuation report of Banco Popular there are concerns about the quality of the valuation 
performed. The independent valuator Deloitte even described it as “highly uncertain”. Moreover, the 
report provided a broad range for the value of the bank, between €1.3 bn and €-8.2 bn, with a best 
estimate of €-2.0 bn. Taking into account the conversion of subordinated debt, the best estimate is 
equal to the price paid by Banco Santander for the bank in resolution.  
 
 Organisational  
The main challenges for the preparation of the valuation reports is to obtain and process all the 
required information on time, which is necessary to come up with a robust valuation when the 
resolution action is performed. 
3.1.1 Information on the bank in resolution 
Valuations 2 and 3 require granular information on the assets and liabilities of the bank in resolution. 
The information about the assets should primarily allow the valuator to assess the extent to which the 
resolution, including potential resolution tools, might affect the value as well as to assess the quality of 
the assets. This is important notably for assets for which there is no liquid market available. For 
liabilities, it is most important to have the creditor hierarchy in both resolution and national liquidation, 
along with the collateral that has been provided to creditors of the bank. 
 
In the case of Banco Popular, the information on both the assets and liabilities was considered 
incomplete and insufficiently granular.  
“It has been based on public information and information uploaded through the SRB sharepoint and 
a virtual data room available through Intralinks; we have not had access to certain critical 
information”, stressed the valuator Deloitte (2017) in the provisional valuation report on Banco 
Popular.  
More specifically, there appeared to be a lack of information on line-by-line or portfolio-by-portfolio 
yield. Additionally,  
“The information available to us [Deloitte] has not been sufficient to construct a detailed and reliable 
estimate of the creditor hierarchy. This is due principally to the limited availability of information on 
a legal entity level and on intragroup assets and liabilities, and to the fact that the deteriorating 
liquidity position of the entity is likely to result in significant changes to the liability structure between 
the date of the most recent information available to us and the resolution date.” 
The lack of complete, correct and sufficiently granular information makes it more challenging not only 
for the independent valuator to prepare the valuations, but also for parties that would potentially like 
to acquire the bank in resolution. A lack of information is likely to lower the final sales price and thus 
the loss for creditors, as potential candidate purchasers are likely to apply a higher discount when there 
is greater uncertainty about the inherent value of the assets. 
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3.1.2 Time available for preparation 
The (provisional) valuations (valuation 2) need to be ready at the time of the resolution action, which 
is only likely to be only known shortly before the action is taken. This gives the valuator limited time to 
verify the information, perform the valuation and validate the results. 
 
The time available for the valuation depends on the time that the independent valuator is assigned 
and the resolution action is taken. The time available is likely to vary to a large extent, depending on 
the circumstances and the promptness of the authorities. The more predictable the failure of the bank, 
the earlier the resolution authority can assign the independent valuator and the more time the valuator 
has for preparing the report. When the financial situation of a failing bank is likely to worsen rapidly 
and close to resolution as described below, the resolution in turn is likely to be triggered more rapidly, 
which reduces the time for preparing the valuation report.  
 
For example, the provisional valuation report on Banco Popular had to be prepared in just a couple of 
days, which did not allow the valuator to verify information and validate the valuation results. As 
indicated by Deloitte (2017), which prepared the valuation report, 
“In light of the challenging liquidity position of Hippocrates [code name for Banco Popular], we 
have been required to draft this Report in an extremely short period of time. The principal work has 
been limited to twelve days since the date on which we had access to the relevant documentation, 
whereas we would normally expect a project of this nature to take at least six weeks (as initially 
agreed between the SRB and us on 23 May 2017).” 
The limited time available forced the valuator to focus on the main assets and liabilities of which the 
value was uncertain. These are in particular assets for which there are no liquid markets available (loans, 
real estate, etc.). 
 
 Legal 
The legal challenges for the preparation of the valuation reports are broadly twofold. On the one hand, 
there are differences in the national insolvency regimes and potential misselling claims that affect the 
valuation. On the other hand, there are the disclosure practices of the valuator, which might make the 
valuation contestable in court. The bail-in of Banco Popular shareholders and creditors shows that 
investors that lose money are likely to try EU and national judicial remedies to recover their losses 
through claims on the various involved parties, including the European Commission, SRB, Spanish 
resolution authority (FROB), acquirer Santander and others. 
 
3.2.1 National insolvency regimes 
The insolvency regimes vary between countries, which is a specific challenge for valuation 3 (ensuring 
that no creditor is worse off). Although most of the national insolvency regimes aim to recover as much 
as possible of the claims of the creditors, there are differences in the preferred strategies to reach the 
maximum recovery value, such as sales of businesses and unwinding. The regimes also have varying 
incentives for the liquidator. Especially the remuneration level, maximum time spent and involvement 
of the court in decision-making can influence the preferred strategy for unwinding the bank. Indeed, 
when the liquidator has more time, receives higher remuneration per hour and/or the court is not 
having to approve every decision, the liquidator is incentivised to take more time to unwind the bank 
and vice versa. For example, in Spain there is a preference for selling the business in the insolvency 
regime and the liquidator only receives remuneration for 18 months, which incentivises the liquidator 
to keep the unwinding of the entity within that period (Deloitte, 2017). The differences in procedures, 
preferences and judicial systems leads to wide variety in the recovery values, cost of procedures and 
average time required to finish the insolvency proceedings (Valiante, 2016).  
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Additionally, there are differences between the national insolvency regimes and the resolution 
mechanism, such as the treatment of the bank at the consolidated and individual entity level.2, 3 That 
being stated, the latter also relates to whether the resolution follows a single or multiple point-of-entry 
approach. The single point of entry refers in general to the consolidated level and the multiple point of 
entry can refer to consolidation at intermediate levels as well as the individual entity level. Indeed, 
valuation 2 follows the legal structure under the resolution strategy mostly at the consolidated level, 
whereas valuation 3 needs to consider the treatment under the national insolvency regimes at the 
individual entity level.  
 
Finally, banks that are failing or likely to fail are not automatically considered bankrupt under the 
insolvency regimes (Nouy, 2018). This complicates the calibration of the counterfactual for the purpose 
of no creditor being worse off, because the counterfactual might have to be based on a going concern 
instead of a gone concern. 
 
3.2.2 Misselling claims 
Most banks that failed in the past couple of years had sold bail-inable debt instruments (including their 
own MREL-eligible securities4) to their clients. The banks did not always comply with the consumer and 
investor protection rules, which could give some of their clients the right to ask for compensation. 
These claims for the misselling of bail-inable instruments are likely to be filed only when the clients face 
an actual loss, for example due to a bail-in as part of a resolution. These potential claims on the bank in 
resolution can lead to additional losses post-resolution and thus the value of the bank in resolution. It 
is for the independent valuator, however difficult or nearly impossible, to accurately determine these 
losses at the time of the resolution (valuation 2).5  
 
3.2.3 Disclosure 
Disclosure of the valuation report can contribute to the credibility of the valuations, discourage 
creditors from taking legal action and if they nevertheless file a court case it could support the SRB. In 
turn, when the motivation for the valuation is insufficiently established, the disclosed information can 
also give grounds for court cases and provide evidence that can be held against the SRB. The SRB was 
initially hesitant to publish any information on the valuation. After the decision of the SRB Appeal Panel 
on Banco Popular, the SRB published some parts of the valuation reports (valuations 1 and 2). Still, 
substantial parts of the documentation have remained confidential. The SRB indicated three different 
motivations for this: i) protection of public interests; ii) the risk of undermining commercial interests; 
and iii) potential effects on the ongoing valuation of no creditor being worse off (SRB, 2018). This means 
that the valuation reports will have to be formulated in such a way that it is clear that the valuations 
are fair, prudent and realistic even without the parts that are likely to remain confidential.  
 
                                                             
2 For example, on 9 March 2018 the commercial court in Luxembourg denied the request of the national 
resolution authority to put the subsidiary of Latvian ABLV (which had failed at the end of February) into 
liquidation (Deslandes and Magnus, 2018). 
3 In the case of Banco Popular, the valuation was based on the consolidated level, whereas this not possible under 
Spanish insolvency law (Deloitte, 2017). 
4 Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) is the minimum required loss absorption 
capacity of EU banks. 
5 The potential claims from retail clients might be mitigated when the SRB decides to exclude some of the bail-
inable instruments from the bail-in for financial stability reasons. 
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 Economic 
The valuation depends on many different factors and is likely to change over time. Valuations 2 and 3 
require the independent valuator to predict the changes to the bank shortly before the resolution as 
well as the impact of macroeconomic developments after the resolution action. 
3.3.1 Before resolution 
There is in most cases a gap between the date when the information on the assets and liabilities is 
available for the valuation and the date when the resolution action is undertaken. In the case of Banco 
Popular the majority of the information was as of 31 March 2017, which was about two months before 
the resolution date (Deloitte, 2017). In normal times, with stable exposures, funding and market 
conditions, this time gap would have a limited impact on the valuation. Yet especially around the time 
of a resolution the funding and market conditions for the bank are likely to deteriorate, affecting the 
value of the assets and composition of the liabilities. For example, bank runs – which are likely to occur 
around the time that a bank is failing or likely to fail – may lead to a reduction of the unsecured creditors 
that are susceptible to bail-ins.  
 
3.3.2 Economic developments 
Market and economic conditions are likely to change over time. Banks are most likely to fail at times of 
market and economic distress. At those times financial markets are likely to undervalue assets. This has 
a different impact on the various resolution tools. There is a distinction between tools that affect the 
loss and required recapitalisation of the bank in resolution (such as the sale of business, bridge 
institution and asset separation tools) on the one hand, and the bail-in tool on the other hand, which 
determines how the losses and recapitalisation are distributed across creditors.  
 
Looking at the resolution tools that impact the loss and recapitalisation (see Table 1), the values of the 
bridge institution tool and asset separation tool depend on future economic developments, whereas 
the sale of business value depends on the market value at the time that the sales price is agreed, usually 
around the resolution action. This means that the actual losses of the bridge institution and asset 
separation can increase or decrease after the valuation and resolution action, depending on economic 
developments. This could potentially trigger recurring bail-ins at the point when economic conditions 
deteriorate and the capital buffers prove too conservative.6   
                                                             
6 The economic value of the assets for bridge institutions and asset management companies may not necessarily 
be the same as the accounting value of the assets of the resolved bank, which might mean that some liabilities 
that have been written down still have book value. Indeed, not all accounting standards anticipate all the 
expected losses. This forms an additional motivation for the resolution authority to use the sale of business tool. 
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Table 1: Valuation across selected resolution tools 
Resolution tool 
Sale of business 
(partial) 
Sale of business 
(all) 
Bridge 
institution 
Asset 
separation 
Description 
Part of bank 
assets are sold to 
other banks or 
investors 
All bank assets 
are sold to other 
banks or 
investors 
Selected assets 
and liabilities are 
transferred to a 
new bank 
Legacy assets 
are transferred 
to an asset 
management 
company (AMC) 
Type of institution Bank Bank 
Bank (bridge-
institution) 
Non-bank 
(remaining-part) 
Non-bank 
(AMC)/bank 
(other) 
Capital required 
No (sold part) 
Yes (remaining 
bank) 
No 
Yes (bridge 
bank) 
No (institution 
unwinding 
remaining part) 
No (AMC) 
Yes (remaining 
bank) 
Type of valuation 
Market 
(sold part) 
Economic 
(remaining bank) 
Market Economic Economic 
Asset value Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Franchise value Yes Yes Yes No 
Hard bail-in Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Soft bail-in Yes No Yes Yes 
Chance for 
multiple bail-ins 
Yes No Yes Yes 
Note: Bail-in, which officially is also a resolution tool, has not been included in this table since it is the outcome of 
the valuation and does not affect the valuation. 
Source: Own elaboration based on De Groen (2018). 
 
The undervaluation of assets in systemic crises is likely to lead to a valuation of the bank in resolution 
below the intrinsic value. Indeed, the counterfactual to determine whether creditors are worse off than 
in liquidation is likely to be estimated lower than the actual value if the assets were unwound over a 
longer period, which would allow the value of the assets to recover. This would decrease the losses for 
the creditors in the medium to long term.  
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 SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE VALUATION IN RESOLUTION 
There are many different options to mitigate at least some of the organisational, legal and economic 
challenges outlined in the previous section. In this section several concrete options that do not 
necessarily require legal intervention to improve the robustness of the valuation in resolution are 
assessed. The measures include improved IT systems, enhanced use of historical data, a shorter tender 
procedure, a moratorium and a separate insolvency regime for banks. 
 
 IT systems 
The IT systems of the banks that might be subject to resolution and the SRB need to be able to provide 
the independent valuator the information it needs to provide a robust valuation at the time of the 
resolution action. Statements in the valuation report on Banco Popular as well as the audit of the SRB 
by the European Court of Auditors have raised some doubts about the banks’ ability to provide the 
required information in time.  
 
In its 2017 report on the SRB brief, the European Court of Auditors is clear about the readiness of the 
SRB for valuations in resolution:  
“The Single Rulebook requires a description of the information that is necessary to implement the 
resolution strategy. An important part of this is the provision of information on the valuation of the 
bank for resolution purposes, which is a very complex and time-consuming procedure. We found no 
statements in this regard in any of the sampled chapters. It follows that the SRB was unable, as 
required, to assess the feasibility of delivering such information.”  
Moreover, the IT systems of some banks have problems in delivering the data required for the bail-in 
on time (ECA, 2017). 
 
The SRB would thus have to list the information required for the valuation in resolution in the resolution 
plans and communicate the information requirements to the banks under its remit. The valuator in 
particular requires information on the exposures, valuation techniques, creditworthiness of borrowers, 
collateral and creditor hierarchy. Moreover, the SRB has to ensure that the banks have the IT systems 
and processes in place to deliver the information in a standardised format to them in time. The 
standardisation as well as quality assurance processes are important to reduce the time required to 
prepare the data for the valuation exercise by the independent valuator. The time available for the 
valuation is in most cases likely to be insufficient to verify the quality of the information or improve the 
processes to generate the information. This means that the SRB needs to address this in the resolution 
planning process. When it finds deficits in the IT systems or information collection these should be 
addressed in the impediments to resolution processes. Additionally, the SRB should also ensure that 
the independent valuator has not only the expertise but also the systems and procedures in place to 
analyse the data in a very short period of time. The SRB can formulate this as one of the criteria in the 
tender specifications that the independent valuators need to meet, but also by requiring regular audits 
or test runs of the IT systems and processes. 
 
The information is potentially changing rapidly around the time of the resolution. This requires that the 
bank in resolution must be able to generate balance sheets ideally on a daily basis. Most banks have 
up-to-date information available on their trading business (mostly valued at fair value), but not for their 
retail and commercial businesses (mostly valued at amortised costs) (RBS, 2015). These currently have 
longer timescales in place to prepare their balance sheets. Especially the value adjustments of assets 
for which no market values are available are traditionally only performed at intervals. This can be 
addressed by allowing the banks to perform the major valuation adjustments on, for instance, a 
monthly or quarterly basis. This would imply no or only a limited change compared to the current 
practise of systemic banks. 
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It is important that the SRB and valuator can access the data without the bank noticing, to ensure that 
the valuation process does not distort any recovery process underway and trigger a resolution. 
 
 Historical data 
The current regulation and technical standards leave room for flexibility in the methodologies and 
assumptions for the valuations. In order to enhance the consistency between the different valuations 
and make them more evidence-based, historical data from previous bank failures could be used to 
formulate and verify the assumptions. This would require that the SRB actively collects information on 
failing banks (resolution and liquidation) and shares this information with the independent valuator, 
ideally in a manner such that it can be easily integrated into the valuation models used by the 
independent valuators. 
At present, the public information on failing is rather scarce and often not presented in a structured 
manner (De Groen and Gros, 2015; De Groen, 2018). Banks in liquidation are usually no longer required 
to provide annual reports and the information in the reports of the liquidator tends to give insufficient 
detail. For example, for the valuation in resolution it is particularly important to have information on 
the liquidity outflows around the time of resolution, which requires more frequent reporting. In order 
to obtain this kind of information the SRB might have to strengthen its collaboration with the 
supervisory authorities, national resolution authorities, European Commission (DG for Competition) 
and local authorities. In some instances, laws might have to be amended to allow access by the 
resolution authorities to this confidential data and to use it for the valuation of other banks. 
The use of historical data will also enhance the SRB and valuators’ understanding of the financial 
situation before, during and after the resolution action. Indeed, it will facilitate not only assessment of 
the deterioration and recovery of the financial situation, but also identification of the factors that 
contribute to this. 
 
 Tender procedure  
The time available for valuation could be increased by appointing the independent valuator earlier in 
the process. This might mean that the SRB decides earlier to call for the valuation, but also the 
shortening of the actual tender procedure. The latter requires that immediately after the decision to 
conduct a valuation, the SRB is able to issue the term sheet for the valuation to the parties in the 
framework, which requires that this term sheet is standardised and allows for sufficient flexibility to 
address the uncertainties regarding the required valuations in the process. Moreover, the preparation 
of the term sheet as part of the procedure could potentially, at least partially, be performed before the 
actual call for proposals is launched (for example, the identification of potential conflicts of interests), 
instead of once the invitation for tender has been launched as is currently the case. The same is true for 
the response time and short standard response format, which would ease the assessment of the bids. 
All this could reduce the time required for the selection of the independent valuator to within a couple 
of days from the almost a week that was required in the case of Banco Popular. 
 Moratorium 
A potential alternative to provide some more time to prepare the resolution action could be a 
moratorium. The European Commission has already proposed two forms of moratoria,7 which enable 
a suspension of bank payments for a short period during the early intervention and resolution 
                                                             
7 See the Proposal for a directive of the European parliament and of the council amending Directive 2014/59/EU 
on loss-absorbing and recapitalisation capacity of credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Directive 98/26/EC, Directive 2002/47/EC, Directive 2012/30/EU, Directive 2011/35/EU, Directive 2005/56/EC, 
Directive 2004/25/EC and Directive 2007/36/EC, COM(2016) 852 final, European Commission, Brussels (2016). 
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respectively. The duration of the moratorium in the European Commission proposal is limited to up to 
five working days, which extends the time available for the resolution action from one night or 
weekend to almost a week. For the valuation it would thus slightly increase the available time to 
complete the (provisional) valuation report. 
 
Although a moratorium can provide the necessary time to complete the valuation, prepare the 
resolution tools and bail-in, it is also likely to make the resolution more disruptive and more similar to 
liquidation. The moratorium increases the negative impact on the broader economy and potentially 
reduces the franchise value of the bank. In particular, retail clients and SMEs often depend on a single 
bank for their payment transactions and might face problems in making payments when their bank 
fails, implying negative spill-over effects for the wider economy. For this reason and to maintain 
depositor confidence, the pay-out period of the current deposit insurance is put at a maximum of seven 
working days.8 The moratorium should therefore only be used in exceptional cases and kept as short 
as possible. 
 
 Harmonised insolvency regimes 
The single resolution mechanism is built on top of national insolvency laws, and requires that there is 
a provision that no creditor is worse off in resolution than under the national insolvency regimes. This 
poses some additional operational challenges to the SRB, which needs to be acquainted with 19 
different legal systems in the eurozone. In practise, most of the banks under the remit of the SRB are 
active with entities in several countries, which means that expertise on several national regimes may 
be required in a single resolution case. 
 
The harmonisation of the insolvency regimes for banks at the EU or eurozone level would especially 
ease the resolution of cross-border banks, including the preparation of the valuation reports. Indeed, a 
harmonised insolvency regime imply a common ranking of creditors, priorities, approach and 
procedures. In particular the harmonisation of the creditor hierarchy across countries and regimes is 
important for the preparation of the valuation reports (Valiante, 2016), as it would require the SRB only 
have to be acquainted with a single rule book for the EU or eurozone. 
 
Ideally the resolution mechanism would be integrated in the insolvency regime. This would provide 
the SRB especially more flexibility to weigh the various interests at stake and reduce the legal 
uncertainty. The current insolvency laws are often prioritising the recovery of the funds for (individual) 
creditors, whereas in the case of bank failures there are also other interests such as preserving financial 
stability, which not necessarily go hand in hand. The SRB might for instance decide that for financial 
stability reasons it is important that certain liabilities are excluded from bail-in or more expensive 
resolution actions are taken. Under the current regime it has than a higher risk that it will receive claims 
from creditors under a no creditor worse off provision. This provision is necessary in the current 
resolution regime to ensure that the property rights of the creditors are respected.  
 
However, the existence of the no creditor worse off provision increases the legal uncertainty. It is not 
unlikely that the SRB has to compensate bailed-in creditors under the current regime, especially when 
a resolution does not necessarily imply that a bank is considered default in the absence of resolution. 
This is especially an issue when the failing or likely to fail call (valuation 1) is made based on future 
                                                             
8 See Article 8, OJ L 173 of 12.6.2014  
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0049&from=EN).  
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illiquidity. Indeed, most insolvency regimes require actual and present illiquidity to activate bankruptcy 
(Nouy, 2018). This proved already a problem for the Latvian ABLV which was considered failing or likely 
to fail, but could not immediately be liquidated. In these cases, the SRB cannot assume that the losses 
given default, which provide the main financial space to use the resolution tools in the absence of 
resolution.  
 
A harmonised insolvency regime for banks that integrates the resolution mechanism could take various 
forms. One option would be to create a special chapter of the insolvency law for bank insolvencies. 
Such approach to resolution of systemically important financial institutions is currently considered in 
the US, where the US Treasury proposed to create a New Chapter 14 Bankruptcy regime to replace the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority (US Treasury, 2018). Translated to the European context the US Treasury 
basically proposes to transfer the assets and the part of the liabilities that are not bailed-in to a bridge 
bank. Whether liabilities are transferred to the bridge bank depends on a procedure similar to the 
current valuation 2, including an initial provisional valuation with buffer and final valuation. These 
valuations are still necessary to determine the allocation of losses among the holders of bail-inable 
liabilities. The liability holders at risk to be bailed-in, in first instance remain a claim on the bank in 
resolution, which is at the finalisation of the valuation either written down or converted to shares in 
the bridge bank. This way the property rights of the creditors is respected without the need for a no 
creditor worse off provision and corresponding valuation 3. The bailed-in creditors would also under 
such a harmonised regime have the right to contest the resolution in court.  
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 CONCLUSIONS 
The enhanced burden sharing in the resolution mechanism has increased the importance of the 
valuation exercises, compared with the ad hoc government capital support during the financial and 
economic crises. The valuation exercises not only determine when a bank is considered failing or likely 
to fail (valuation 1), but also which creditors will be bailed in (valuation 2) and need to be compensated 
(valuation 3).  
 
The fact that the creditors are now supposed to cover all the losses has made the valuation exercise 
more challenging than in the aftermath of the crisis. In this analysis, seven key challenges of an 
organisational, legal and economic nature have been identified and discussed. Based on the valuation 
report for Banco Popular, in particular organisational challenges (such as the time and information 
available for the valuation) make it difficult to determine robust results.  
 
The potential solutions primarily aim to increase the time available for valuation 2 and improve the 
information available for both valuations 2 and 3. At the same time, the potential solutions – such as 
improvement of the IT systems, enhanced collection and use of historical data, a shorter selection 
procedure to appoint the independent evaluator, moratoria and a harmonised insolvency regime for 
banks – also address at least to some extent the legal and economic challenges (see Table 2). Misselling 
claims are the only challenge for which no real solution is proposed. Given the limited time available 
for preparing the valuation, it is unlikely that justified misselling claims can be accurately estimated. 
The measures in this area should primarily aim to avoid that there is a ground to establish these claims, 
which requires restrictions on the sale of bail-inable liabilities to own clients and/or enhanced 
supervision. 
 
Table 2: Challenges and potential solutions for valuation in resolution 
Challenges 
Potential solutions 
IT systems 
Historical 
data 
Tender 
procedure 
Moratorium 
Harmonised 
insolvency 
regimes 
Organisational      
• Information on the bank in resolution √    √ 
• Time available for preparation of the report   √ √  
Legal      
• National insolvency regimes √    √ 
• Misselling claims      
• Disclosure √ √    
Economic      
• Before resolution  √  √  
• Economic developments  √    
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The SRB could implement most of these solutions without legal intervention. It already has the 
possibility to obtain information from the banks under its remit, it can change the tender procedure as 
long as it remains within the European procurement rules and the technical standards foresee the use 
of historical data. However, legislative changes might be needed in order for the SRB to obtain the 
sometimes confidential data and share it with the independent valuators. The European Commission 
has already included this possibility in the EU banking reform package that is currently being discussed 
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by the co-legislators. It is only the harmonisation of the national insolvency regimes for banks that 
would require legislative intervention, but this might be the most complicated to implement. The 
current national insolvency laws in most Member States are closely related to other areas of law and 
policies (European Commission, 2009). 
 
Finally, the valuation reports still seem a work in progress. The public information on the valuation 
reports at the time of writing remains rather limited. This means that there might be challenges for the 
preparation of the valuation reports that are not currently perceived as such. Some of these might, for 
instance, originate from the lawsuits that are underway. The valuation practices might therefore have 
to be reviewed after the rulings in the various ongoing court cases. Moreover, at present the valuation 
exercise primarily seems to facilitate the execution of the preferred resolution strategy. But this might 
change in the future. At that point, the valuation reports (valuation 2) could potentially be extended to 
make them more informative, by including the estimated values of the banks in resolution under 
alternative resolution strategies as well.  
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ANNEX: SUGGESTED QUESTIONS FOR THE HEARING 
Dr Elke König, Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), will come to the European Parliament for a 
public hearing of the ECON committee in June 2018. In the context of this paper on valuation reports, 
the author suggests asking the following questions during the Q&A part of the hearing: 
 
• Anticipating the surge in cashless and instant payments as well as the substantial share of retail 
clients and SMEs with a single bank account for their transactions, should not the use of a 
moratorium be avoided as much as possible? 
• Could ‘actual’ valuation data on banks (in the eurozone) that have entered resolution and 
national insolvency regimes in the past be of any use to making the valuations during 
resolution more accurate? If so, could the SRB collect this information and provide it to the 
valuator when performing the valuation? 
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This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the 
request of the ECON Committee. It discusses the challenges concerning bank 
valuation reports in resolution. The resolution mechanism has three types of 
valuation reports, respectively to determine whether a bank is failing or likely 
to fail (valuation 1), to inform the use of the resolution tools including bail-in 
(valuation 2), and to ensure that the no creditor worse off condition is respected 
(valuation 3). The first experience with the preparation of valuation reports 
shows that even with the more formal procedures there are still substantial 
uncertainties regarding the outcome of these valuations due to organisational, 
legal and economic challenges. Additional mitigating measures should be 
considered to reduce the uncertainty. 
